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Metatheory
Garrick B. Pursley*
Constitutional theory has been challenged in recent years, by
significant figures in the legal field, as essentially pointless. Too much
normativity, not enough neutrality; too much conjecture, not enough
data; too much politics, not enough truth. How should we constitutional
theorists answer this basic challenge to the foundation of our research
program? I suggest one possible solution here: we can make the
discipline more rigorous by changing the way in which we assess
competing claims in constitutional theory. Drawing on important work
in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and legal theory, I examine
the question of theory assessment and selection. I propose a set of
criteria for constitutional theory selection consistent with the most
cutting edge work in these fields and explain how we can use these
criteria—simplicity, consilience, conservatism, and fruitfulness—and
demonstrate how they operate to make theory assessment more
sophisticated by applying them to two distinct sets of competing
theoretical claims. Along the way, I discuss perennial debates like the
controversy between those who claim that adjudication should be
conducted with reference to legal reasons only and those who claim that
courts may consider extra-legal reasons, including moral reasons, to
decide cases. I then turn to examine a much more recent debate about
the nature of certain doctrinal structures in constitutional adjudication.
I argue, in the end, that more nuanced theory assessment techniques will
advance constitutional theory in a manner that simultaneously answers
foundational challenges and makes the research program more likely to
produce testable, provable claims about the nature of constitutionalism
going forward.
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INTRODUCTION
Judge Posner and, more recently, Judge Wilkinson have issued a fairly
stout challenge to constitutional theorists1: show that constitutional
theory is actually good for something or abandon it as a crumbling,
Ptolemaic research program. I want to answer this challenge by
undermining its hidden premise—namely, that constitutional theory is
not actually rigorous enough to disclose truth or generate real knowledge
such that it can only be valuable, if at all, in an instrumental sense. My
goal here is to rebut this premise by developing a way to make
constitutional theory somewhat more rigorous.
In this Article, “metatheory” means the analysis of the properties of
theories in some field. Here, I will focus on constitutional theory and on
one particular metatheoretical problem: constitutional theory choice or
assessment. Theorists have no well-settled criteria for choosing among
competing theses and are all over the place with respect to how to
proceed. I will canvass proposals that exist in the current literature and
develop a proposal of my own regarding how we should do constitutional
metatheory. The big issue here seems to be whether we should treat
constitutional theory as a descriptive or normative discipline for
metatheoretical purposes. I will argue that we must develop different
assessment regimes for each category of claim—descriptive and
normative, and perhaps others—because constitutional theory
inescapably involves both kinds of claims. And, contrary to the view that
has stymied previous metatheoretical efforts, we cannot evaluate
descriptive and normative constitutional theory claims according to a
1. See Richard Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (Madison
lecture); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2012).
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single criterion or set of criteria. Instead, because descriptive and
normative claims serve different functions (or have different objectives),
they must be assessed differently.
Constitutional theory does not have much of a literature on theory
selection criteria,2 and what there is suggests normative criteria—
Professor Fallon, for example, argues that
the choice among theories should be based on which theory will best
advance shared, though vague and sometimes competing, goals of (1)
satisfying the requirements of the rule of law; (2) preserving fair
opportunity for majority rule under a scheme of political democracy;
and (3) promoting substantive justice by protecting a morally and
politically acceptable set of individual rights.3

But this cannot be right generally, because normative criteria are
inappropriate for descriptive constitutional theory claims—claims that
aspire to reveal what is the case, rather than demonstrate what should be
the case. Or so I shall argue.4
Theory assessment is arguably not objective—for normative theories
this is probably obvious, though it will need some explaining because I
will argue eventually that we want to adopt a process that brings us closer
and closer to objectivity. For positive (or descriptive) claims, this is more
2. There have been a couple of preliminary efforts in other fields of legal theory that are not
obviously immediately applicable to constitutional theory claims of the kind I consider here. See,
e.g., Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2009)
(deploying a set of theory selection criteria for assessing competing claims in general
jurisprudence); W. Bradley Wendel, Explanation in Legal Scholarship: The Inferential Structure
of Doctrinal Legal Analysis, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1041–42 (2011) (exploring theory
selection criteria for legal theory generally, and in particular legal theory claims of the following
form: “(1) Here is some legal doctrine or rule; (2) courts and scholars . . . tend to think that its point,
rationale, purpose, or function is X . . . ; (3) but I think they’re mistaken, and the doctrine is really
‘all about’ Y; (4) here is some evidence supporting my claim; (5) therefore, we should understand
the point of the rule or doctrine as Y.”).
3. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 538–
39 (1999). Fallon’s discussion is in a sense confusing—he argues that a “sound” constitutional
theory should satisfy this sort of composite normative criterion, see id. at 538, but by “sound” he
must not mean logically sound, as a logically sound theory (having true premises and a conclusion
that follows logically from those premises) will not necessarily comport with Fallon’s evaluative
criteria. Put simply, logical soundness is a criterion distinct from other evaluative criteria, as I
argue criteria for descriptive effectiveness are distinct from criteria of normative desirability.
4. Different criteria are probably appropriate for different kinds of theories—we can distinguish
(1) descriptive or positive theory claims whose object is to say something accurate about what there
is; examples include realism, attitudinal modelers, etc.; (2) prescriptive or normative theory claims
whose object is to say X should be the case (or Y should not be the case); examples include 1
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1998);
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); and (3) conceptual theory claims; examples include
ADRIAN VERMUELE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011); Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin
Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 545 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307 (2008).
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controversial and bound up in the movement from the verificationism that
held sway in the nineteenth and early twentieth century to the realization
occurring after Kuhn, Quine, and Hempel that even in science, theory
assessment criteria are in some sense subjective.
One thing that seems clear is that theory selection rubrics should be
selected according to the broad purpose of the category of theories to
which the candidates that you are assessing belong. Thomas Kuhn
argues that there is not an objectively correct set of theory selection
criteria—it is no longer generally viewed as correct to characterize
scientific theories as actually disclosing true facts about the world;
instead, we say that they approximate truths about reality, and these
theory selection criteria are meant to identify the likely more accurate
approximation among competitors.5 Accordingly, in science, theories are
evaluated on criteria that are broadly considered appropriate in the light
of the general characteristics and aims of science as a practice.6 There is
some debate, of course, about what distinguishes science from other
forms of inquiry;7 but it seems relatively uncontroversial to suggest that
science as a practice “avoids appeals to final causes, vital forces, or
general bunkum,” “answer[s] to criteria of empirical adequacy,” and
makes claims that are “general, capable of supporting counterfactuals,
and above all . . . that purport to be true or false with reference to
something external; that is, science must relate to the natural world.”8
Given these aims, it is unsurprising that criteria for theory selection that
enjoy consensus support among scientists include simplicity, consilience
(or explanatory power and capacity), conservatism (or consistency with
other well-accepted views about the world), and potential fruitfulness for
future research.9

5. This is a matter of serious debate in the scientific and philosophical communities; thus, rather
than defend at length a controversial position, I am instead assuming that the best a descriptive
constitutional theory claim can aspire to is an accurate approximation of the reality of our
constitutional norms. More might be possible, but I set that possibility aside here.
6. See Wendel, supra note 2, at 1051–52; Thomas Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment and
Theory Choice, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND
CHANGE 320, 320–21 (1977); Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive
Theory Choice, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 259, 269 (2013).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 58–65 (discussing the controversy surrounding Popper’s attempt to
demarcate science).
8. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1060–61 (citing ROBERT NOLA & HOWARD SANKEY, THEORIES OF
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 55–56, 74–77, 341–44 (2007); CARL G. HEMPEL, The Logic of Functional
Analysis, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 297, 304 (1965)).
9. Kuhn, supra note 6 at 320–22; see Brian R. Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism
Reconsidered, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 59–80 (2007) (applying criteria of explanatory capacity,
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The few theorists to have considered the question of theory assessment
in legal theory suggest that a similar account of the “characteristics and
virtues” of law as a practice should inform the choice of evaluative
criteria.10 They tend to view legal reasoning and thus legal theory as
inherently normative; based on this view they maintain that at least some
of the criteria for theory selection must be drawn from the substantive
“background” normative commitments of legal practice.11 I do not think
anyone believes that incorporating such a criterion is logically necessary
or that theory assessment is impossible without doing so; 12 and I doubt
that such a criterion would be appropriate or yield broadly acceptable
results given the absence of consensus on just about any value drawn
from legal practice that could serve as a theory selection criterion.13
Consistent with this position of intrasystemic neutrality, I will orient the
following discussion in terms of my aim of explaining what law courts
are applying in structural cases—that is, the aim to make a theory-of-law
claim—and assess alternative theories that claim the same goal.14 The
competitor theories are the value-based and interpretive theories some
examples of which were discussed above. To be clear, the choice here is
between these theories, which hold that the content of the law is only that
which accords with some value proposition or interpretive theory, on the
one hand, and my view on which we recognize both norms constituted by
deep patterns of convergent official practice and norms validated
according to one—or more than one—alternative theories as parts of the

“ontological austerity” (simplicity), and consistency with empirical research programs
(conservatism) to argue that legal positivism is the best going general theory of law).
10. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 3, at 538–41 (arguing that basic values of the legal system must
bear on theory choice); Wendel, supra note 2, at 1060 (“I believe a criteria of theory-acceptance in
legal scholarship can (and indeed must) be derived from higher-order characteristics and virtues of
legal reasoning as a practice.”).
11. See supra notes 16–73 and accompanying text; see also Wendel, supra note 2, at 1061–64
(considering whether the assessment of explanations in legal theory should be “connected with
wider normative and epistemological” commitments).
12. Cf. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1063 (expressing uncertainty about incorporating substantive
value-based criterion into theory assessment; leaving open the question whether such an approach
is possible or justifiable).
13. See supra notes 16–73 and accompanying text. This is not to deny that the entire project of
selecting among competing theories is inherently normative—of course it is, but that it is makes
only second-order normative claims about what constitutional theorists should do and believe and
is in this sense similar in normative orientation to the application of the inference to the best
explanation approach in scientific theory selection. Cf. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1049 (noting the
inherent normativity of inference to the best explanation).
14. Cf. Bartrum, supra note 6, at 269 (noting that Kuhnian “value judgments” about theory
selection are not entirely idiosyncratic; and instead, observing scientific practice suggests that
scientists “assess competing theoretical paradigms against the values [they] judge[] to be most
important to a particular scientific endeavor”).
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Constitution, on the other.15
Accordingly, our theory selection process should vary as between
descriptive legal theory claims and normative constitutional theory
claims. I will argue that we can readily analogize descriptive theory
claims to scientific theory claims and import theory selection criteria
from the sciences for use in law, and I will illustrate how this might work.
The caveat here is that two criteria one frequently sees in discussions of
scientific theory assessment—falsifiability and predictive power—are
not always apt in the context of descriptive legal theory (artifacts, deeply
opaque causal sequences, etc.). This is of course not to say that predictive
hypotheses are impossible in law—the attitudinal model, and large
volumes of empirical legal theory in commercial law fields, demonstrates
that it is. But not all descriptive legal theories are readily empirically
testable. That, alone, does not render them invalid or less good than
competing theories (often, the directly competing theories will suffer this
same flaw). What we want is a second-best set of criteria to apply where
falsification and predictive power are inapt. I will discuss inference to
the best explanation criteria as a good set of criteria in this regard.16
The much more difficult metatheoretical problem is how to choose
among normative legal theory claims. I will hope to resolve a conceptual
problem with the approach to normative theory choice that is suggested
in the tiny literature that exists on the question. They suggest using
normative criteria from within the competing theories (evaluating
theoretical claims according to their tendency to promote justice, the rule
of law, and so forth), but that cannot be right; it is question begging. We
need more work on this problem and I will make some preliminary
suggestions about what that research program should look like.
In Part I, I canvas the literature on theory assessment in legal theory
and then draw lessons from work on theory evaluation from the
philosophy of science to suggest ways in which we can improve our
theory assessment methods in law. The point is to articulate a set of
criteria by which we may effectively compare theoretical claims that
compete with one another and say, with some plausible certainty, that one
is better or more correct than another. My focus will be on constitutional
theory claims, but the criteria that I endorse here can be applied to most
claims in legal theory. The bulk of Part I focuses on positive (descriptive)

15. This idea of a combination of merit-based and merit-neutral criteria of legal validity is
predicated on my neutrality as between inclusive legal positivism, which allows that a given rule
of recognition might validate some norms as law based on their merits, and exclusive legal
positivism, which does not.
16. See infra note 24.
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claims in legal theory; that is because for the most part normative claims
are foreign to the sciences. But I will turn in the last section of Part I to
consider the more difficult challenge: evaluating competing normative
claims in legal theory. While I cannot resolve the difficulties attendant
to the task of assessing such claims here—there is basic work in
epistemology that remains to be done to complete that task—I will hope
to frame future research on this issue. In Part II, I turn to an application
of these insights, applying the evaluative criteria that I develop in Part I
to a very nuanced claim in constitutional theory—namely, the argument
that it is beneficial to distinguish a category of constitutional doctrines
(“anti-evasion doctrines”) from other such categories. I examine the
purported benefits of this claim, and the ways in which it compares to
other claims in what has come to be called metadoctrinal constitutional
theory, to demonstrate the usefulness of the theory assessment tools I
propose here. The conclusion is preliminary, and provisional: It seems
that we can deploy a more rigorous system of theory assessment criteria
in legal theory. It will take a number of additional applications to move
this metatheoretical insight to the center of the legal theory research
program. But if we do that, we can answer Judge Posner’s and Judge
Wilkinson’s challenges, and make legal theory more acceptable across
disciplines. And that is no small thing.
I. POSITIVE THEORY ASSESSMENT
Selecting among positive (descriptive) theories is not easy, but at least
it is not terribly controversial. There is a ready analogue in the
philosophy of science.
A. The Analogy to Science
There is nothing objectionable in principle about applying normative
criteria in selecting among competing constitutional theories; it is just not
the kind of evaluation I want to highlight here. I want to distinguish
theories by the likely correspondence of their descriptive claims with
reality; normative criteria distinguish theories by their likely practical
results if adopted. As Fallon argues, “theories should be judged by their
likely fruits. To determine which theory would best promote ultimate
goals, it is crucial to assess what kinds of judicial decisions would likely
be made if a particular theory were adopted.”17 He goes on to argue that
“methodological” theories—that is, theories that do not entail any
particular substantive outcomes, like legal positivism 18—are of “less
17. Fallon, supra note 3, at 538–39.
18. See John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 201–02 (2001)
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clear” attractiveness.19 But this is simply a different question to ask about
constitutional theories, and it bears no necessary (logical or empirical)
relationship to my question about descriptive accuracy. Moreover,
applying normative criteria to select among descriptive theories of law is
question begging; after all, the goal of such theories is to provide an
accurate picture of what the constitutional law is, and theorists tend to
claim that “the Constitution” or “our constitutionalism” is the source of
the values that form the basis for normative assessments. 20 To the extent
that descriptive constitutional theories of law, to satisfy the consilience
criterion (or, more roughly, Fallon’s “fit” criterion), must identify which
values out of the field of possibilities are in fact accepted in constitutional
practice or otherwise entrenched in constitutional law, then we cannot
evaluate the success of the theory based on assumed values that the theory
itself is supposed to identify.
Descriptive legal theory, which purports to reveal what is the case, is
distinct from scientific theory for various reasons: Law is different from
the natural phenomena that are the objects of science insofar as law is not
a natural kind—it is an artifact that is constituted by human practice.21
Among other things, human practices and their artifacts may change over
time while physical phenomena (for the most part and excepting quantum
mechanical phenomena) remain fixed regardless of human observation or
action. Moreover, the object of descriptive constitutional theory—
constitutional practice—is a notoriously difficult, moving target; for
example, “a number of interpretive paradigms can coexist peacefully in
constitutional practice, and no one paradigm is likely to force the others
out of business.”22 Even if some of our constitutional norms can be
clearly identified, then, it is very difficult to use that information to
predict practical outcomes in the light of the widely varying approaches
observable in constitutional practice under which constitutional norms
may be given legal effect in constitutional disputes. For this reason,
among others, one typical scientific theory evaluation criterion—

(explaining that legal positivism’s core claim—norms are legal norms in virtue of their sources, not
their merits—is “normatively inert”).
19. Fallon, supra note 3, at 539.
20. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 551 (“[I]n identifying three commonly accepted evaluative
criteria for constitutional theories, I do not mean to offer transcendent or foundational arguments.
Questions about appropriate evaluative criteria for constitutional theories arise within the same
debates in which those criteria are invoked.”); Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional
Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 598 (1999) (“Any claim that some set of [normative] priorities and
[relative] weights [among such priorities] is best is itself a highly contestable claim of constitutional
theory.”).
21. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
22. Bartrum, supra note 6, at 272.

15_PURSLEY FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/30/2016 1:35 PM

Metatheory

1341

predictive power23—seems inapt for choosing among descriptive
constitutional theory theses.
Consider, for example, the question which of the following two
positive legal theory claims is better: Realism versus some kind of
Formalism (judges consider only the syllogistic legal reasons). We will
want to choose a way to evaluate these competitors according to their
basic objective. As that seems to describe accurately some aspect of
reality, the natural analogue is scientific theory, and luckily there is very
robust and well-developed literature on theory assessment and selection
in science. I cannot do it justice here, but I will provide an overview.
Positive constitutional theory claims, like descriptive claims in other
disciplines, should be subjected to the theory selection criteria that we
apply to theories that aim to disclose what is the case (the truth about or
at least our best estimate of reality). 24 In this one, limited sense—that
they aim to reveal something about what is the case—descriptive
constitutional theory claims are like claims in natural and social sciences.
This is emphatically not to assert something like “Langdell’s widely
mocked claim that law can be treated as a science”;25 nor is it to deny that
23. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 7–9 (1984) (arguing that the principal, perhaps only, proper test of a positive
economic theory should be its predictive power). Friedman’s view is broadly indicative of the
falsifiability approach suggested by Karl Popper (under which the best way to test a theory is not
to ask about its conformance to reality but instead about whether additional observations falsify it).
See generally KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 150–
75 (1972); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 44 (1968) [hereinafter POPPER,
LOGIC]. Although the Popperian approach is routinely cited in legal literature, see Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351 (2001) (collecting
citations), there is debate within the sciences and the philosophy of science about the propriety of
these criteria for evaluating scientific theories. Thomas Kuhn, for example, does not include
falsifiability on his list of five criteria for choosing among scientific theories. See Kuhn, supra note
6, at 321–22 (noting scientific consensus on accuracy, simplicity, scope, consistency (internal and
with other theories), and fruitfulness (not limited to predictive power, but more broadly a theory’s
potential to “disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships among those already
known”)).
24. I am using the language of the inference to the best explanation approach to theory-building
and explanation, rather than anything like a hypothetico-deductivist approach, to avoid vexed
debates in the philosophy of science about the logical possibility of confirmation, whether science
creates knowledge, and so forth. For an overview of these debates, see generally CARL G. HEMPEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 5–51 (1966) (canvassing problems with deductive models of
scientific explanation) [hereinafter HEMPEL, NATURAL SCIENCE]; NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 8,
at 335–45 (canvassing the realism/antirealism debate in philosophy of science); CARL G. HEMPEL,
Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (examining the
hypothetico-deductivist method of confirming proposed explanatory hypotheses with empirical
evidence); Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 J. PHIL. 88 (1965); Paul
R. Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76 (1978).
25. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1064 (referring to Gilmore’s characterization of Langdell’s views
in GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42–48 (1977)).
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the process of assessing competing theories is inherently normative. 26 (I
want to set aside the question of what exactly an “explanation” is—both
this and the related question of whether science or other descriptive
inquiries describe reality (that is, reveal truth) or instead merely describe
phenomena of our experience are controversial and would take more
space than I have to engage.27 An intuitive sense of these concepts will
suffice for the argument that follows.) Instead, while acknowledging that
value judgments inevitably inform the choice of theory selection methods
in science, law, and other disciplines, we must cabin that normative move
to its limited second-order status to avoid conflating the question what
makes a good theory of law with the question what values does law serve
or reflect, as the latter is the kind of question that some theories of law
seek to answer.28 It may be that identifying what the law is requires the
application of some moral, economic, or other criterion, but that is one of
the core disputes between competing theories of law. If we want to
evaluate descriptive constitutional theory claims according to how well
they discharge the aim of disclosing what is the case about law—that is,
if we want to be able to select among competing descriptive constitutional
theory claims according to which is the more descriptively accurate—
then the general theory selecting criteria developed in the philosophy of
science should apply.29 We need not want to compare theories with
similar objectives; we could instead merely want to critique (or praise)
the claimed facts of the matter the theory serves up rather than determine
the extent to which those claims accurately approximate reality. But that
is not the only position one could take, nor is it the most natural evaluative
26. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321–22; Wendel, supra note 2, at 1064–65; see also Bartrum,
supra note 6, at 269.
27. Relevant debates in the philosophy of science include the methodological debate between
hypothetico-deductivist explanation and inference to the best explanation, see supra note 24; and
the epistemological debate between scientific realists (who argue that science explains reality) and
anti-realists (who argue that science’s aim is to explain our experience, but there is no guarantee
that our experience reflects reality), see NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 8, at 335–45.
28. Compare, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 4 at 190 (arguing that any account of the concept of
law must “explain how what it takes to be law provides a general justification for the exercise of
coercive power by the state”), with H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 8, 239–40 (3d ed. 2012)
(arguing that a general theory of law can be “morally neutral and [with] no justificatory aims: it
[need] not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and structures which
appear in my general account of law”).
29. See generally Kuhn, supra note 6, at 327–29, for an argument that theory selection criteria
in science are properly drawn by theorists based on their perception of the objectives of the relevant
inquiry. See also, e.g., Leiter, supra note 2 (applying the criteria of simplicity, consilience, and
conservatism from the philosophy of science to argue that positivism is the better theory of law
even if it explains certain minor phenomena less well than alternatives because it explains the
majority of the phenomena of the legal system better than alternatives); Leiter, supra note 9, at 9–
13 (comparing, similarly, legal positivism to natural law theories and Dworkin’s theory).
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posture to adopt with respect to descriptive claims.30
B. Assessment Criteria for Legal Theory Claims
In the remainder of this Part, I apply the standard scientific theory
selection criteria to compare my view with other positive theory-of-law
claims in constitutional theory. I explain each criterion, provide
examples, and then argue that the thin-norms account of structural
constitutional doctrine outstrips competing accounts on each of them.
Theories may fare differently along different dimensions, and there is no
consensus as to the weight that should be accorded, say, simplicity
relative to conservatism; but it seems reasonable at least to think that
theories may compensate for failure on some dimensions with success on
others.31
First, it is generally accepted in the philosophy of science, and science
at large, that simpler explanations are preferable to more complex ones,
all else equal.32 In arguing that legal positivism is preferable to
alternative theories of law including natural law theory and Dworkin’s
“law as integrity” account, Leiter highlights positivism’s “ontological
austerity,” or its capacity to explain phenomena “in ways that do not
involve unnecessary, controversial or incredible metaphysical
commitments.”33
My explanation for the dormancy doctrines,
immigration doctrine, and obstacle preemption is simpler than
conventional accounts in two senses. As I have argued elsewhere,
positing a single implied structural norm to underwrite all these doctrines
is simpler than conventional accounts that posit multiple underlying
norms, perhaps one for each of these lines of doctrine—now beyond the
dormant Commerce Clause, dormant Admiralty Clause, and dormant
foreign affairs powers doctrines;34 State Preclusion Thesis (“SPT”)
explains immigration doctrine more simply than conventional accounts
such as the external sovereignty rationale;35 and obstacle preemption
30. Cf. Gardner, supra note 18, at 203–04 (speculating that legal positivism may be
misunderstood in part because “[l]awyers and law teachers find [its] comprehensive normative
inertness . . . hard to swallow”).
31. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 327–29 (noting this relative weights problem). The truly
troublesome case is where competing theories each excel the other one some, but not all, theory
choice criteria. Kuhn argues that in these marginal cases, theory choice is largely a value judgment
particular to individual scientists. See id.
32. Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321–22.
33. Leiter, supra note 9, at 12.
34. See Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 497, 500–02 (2012) (discussing the
simplicity advantage of the State Preclusion Thesis (“SPT”) account of the dormancy doctrines).
35. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (articulating the external
sovereignty rationale for federal immigration power); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent
in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power
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doctrine more simply than the conventional Supremacy Clause
explanation about which I have noted in previous work.36 Further, the
idea of a consensus-based constitutional norm like SPT is more
ontologically austere than, for instance, a value-based account that posits
additional, contestable rule-of-law or social justice principles to explain
and justify these doctrines, with distinct normative cases to be made for
each line of decisions. Similarly, the thin norms account is more
analytically austere than interpretive theory accounts insofar as it posits
norms acceptable across interpretive disciplines and explains the shape
of various doctrines according to pragmatic factors; it does not require
the complex interpretive moves to derive the norms and explain their
implementing doctrines that an originalist account would require.
A second generally accepted criterion is consilience, or how many
phenomena the competing theories are capable of explaining37: “We
prefer more comprehensive explanations—explanations that make sense
of more different kinds of things—to explanations that seem too narrowly
tailored to one kind of datum.”38 Everyone agrees that theory must fit the
phenomena under consideration—it cannot have explanatory power if the
theory does not explain anything.39 But among competing theories that
roughly fit some aspects of the phenomena under consideration, the
consilience inquiry shifts to how many phenomena the theories explain,
respectively.40 So, for example, “Darwin’s theory of natural selection
was able to account for observations that initially seemed unrelated, such
as those pertaining to anatomy (the presence of vestigial organs) and

over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 253 (2002) (discussing and criticizing the “inherent
powers” of sovereignty justification for immigration doctrine).
36. See generally Pursley, supra note 34.
37. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321; Thagard, supra note 24, at 79; see also, e.g., Leiter, supra
note 2, at 1239–40 (applying consilience to assess legal positivism versus competing theories of
law).
38. Leiter, supra note 2, at 1239.
39. Id. (emphasizing explanatory power as a desideratum for positive legal theories); Fallon,
supra note 3, at 549 (“[I]t appears to be agreed all around—indeed, accepted as nearly definitional
of the enterprise of constitutional theorizing—that one important criterion is ‘fit.’ A good
constitutional theory must fit either the written Constitution or surrounding practice. In the absence
of a fit requirement, constitutional theory would lose its anchor in law and collapse into political
theory.”); accord DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 65–68 (emphasizing the importance of explanatory
“fit” for accounts of constitutional law and practice).
40. See Thagard, supra note 24, at 79 (noting that a “theory is more consilient than another if it
explains more classes of facts than the other”). Fallon articulates a descriptive criterion, “fit,” and
argues that “fit” must be with more than the text—it must fit with the larger “practice,” which is in
a sense what I am pressing here. Fallon’s “fit” criterion is somewhat imprecise—as is Dworkin’s,
see DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 67–68. Breaking this rough notion of “fit” out into the simplicity,
consilience, and conservatism criteria is more precise, allows us to draw on the philosophy of
science, and to compare theories for different kinds of fit issues.

15_PURSLEY FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/30/2016 1:35 PM

Metatheory

1345

zoology (the observed differences in related species).”41 As I have
explained, the SPT view explains all at once a wide variety of doctrines
that alternative accounts typically characterize as based on several
different constitutional norms (and thus as in this sense unrelated). A
built-out theory including a few more SPT-like norms would ex hypothesi
explain a great deal more, perhaps most structural doctrine. Moreover,
the interpretive and value neutrality of this thin-norms account means that
it explains doctrines and judicial decisions that proponents of value-based
or interpretive theories would have to characterize as non-lawful—for
example, it explains why, despite the protestations of originalists that the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not legitimately derived from the
original meaning of the Constitution,42 courts continue to apply the
doctrine and other government officials systematically behave as though
it is valid law.43 Originalists advancing a theory-of-law claim would
have to maintain that the many judges and justices who appear to accept
the validity of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in its current form
are either mistaken about what the constitutional law is or are
intentionally disregarding the law.44 Accuracy—a theory’s capacity to
explain actual observations—is a closely related criterion.45 The thinnorms view explains distinctions legal practitioners and scholars make in
everyday talk between, say, what the law is and what the law should be;

41. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1052.
42. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260–63 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (attacking the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine because “[t]he historical record provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to
be other than what it says—an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce”).
43. Similarly, if we hypothesized a converse norm—the National Preclusion Thesis (“NPT”),
namely: the national government may not take actions that undermine the constitutional structure—
to explain the anticommandeering doctrine, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–63
(1992), and other federalism doctrines; strict textualists might object that these doctrines have no
textual foundation. See, e.g., John Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009). The NPT account, however, better
explains the realities of practice in which these federalism doctrines continue to be applied and are
treated as legally valid by most officials.
44. Some originalists appear to embrace this consequence of their views and argue that nonoriginalist precedent should be disregarded—see, for example, Gary Lawson, The Constitutional
Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005), but this is
hardly a consensus position among originalists. See generally Leiter, supra note 2, at 1225–26
(discussing error theoretic accounts in philosophy, and noting that “[a] standing puzzle about [such]
accounts is why a particular discourse persists when all its judgments are false”); John O. McGinnis
& Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009)
(canvassing the debate and arguing that originalism can be reconciled with stare decisis).
45. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 320. See also Wendel, supra note 2, at 1054 (discussing an
“empirical adequacy” criterion concerned with the extent to which competing theories “account for
observed phenomena”).
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many competing accounts cannot capture this distinction because they
hold that the law is only that which is consistent with the very interpretive
theory or value criterion that answers the “should” question. Moreover,
the thin-norms theory can explain, in a manner that competing theories
cannot, an even larger and in some senses more obvious phenomenon:
the stability and durability of the constitutional system despite various
apparently deep disagreements of method and value.
Another accepted criterion, conservatism, suggests that desirable
descriptive theory should leave intact other of our well-accepted views
about the world.46 Leiter maintains that legal positivism is more
desirable than alternatives like natural law theories on this dimension
because, among other things, positivism is consistent with, supported by,
and potentially generative of empirical work on related issues.47
A theory of law that makes explicit the tacit or inchoate concept at play
in scientific research is probably to be preferred to its competitors. If
one surveys . . . the now vast literature on adjudication, which aims to
explore the relative contributions of legal versus non-legal norms to
decision-making by courts, that literature always demarcates the
distinction in positivist terms.48

So, too, the thin-norms account’s capacity to distinguish what the law
is from what one thinks the law should be facilitates empirical analysis
of the influence of legal versus non-legal reasons for decision. Again,
what matters on my view is that judges act as if they accept SPT and
similar norms as valid norms of the constitutional system, and not, rather,
act as though those norms are the reasons for that acceptance. In other
words, the law is the set of norms judges accept, regardless of their
reasons, so that we can assess those reasons without conceding that
discovering a particular set of reasons for acceptance of legal norms
invalidates those norms. Thus the thin-norms view is also consistent with
nearly every theory of adjudication or of constitutional interpretation. It
leaves intact our well-established belief that the constitutional system is
robust and stable despite observed disagreement. Moreover, because it
treats issued judicial decisions as instances of law and identifies
consensus norms from patterns in judicial conclusions rather than their
reasoning; the thin-norms theory is consistent with any account of the
real causes of judicial decisions.49 Value-driven and interpretive theory-

46. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 320; Leiter, supra note 2, at 1239. Some argue that this is more
of an ex ante threshold for distinguishing facially plausible theories from those unworthy of serious
consideration. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 2, at 1049.
47. Leiter, supra note 2, at 12.
48. Id. at 12.
49. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
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of-law claims, however, are inconsistent with empirical work like that on
the attitudinal model—they claim that judges should decide cases based
on some set of values or interpretive commitments, but the empirical
evidence suggests that such proposals are unrealistic in light of judges’
persistent tendency to act in ways not predicted by the relevant legal
reasons.50
A related criterion is fruitfulness—or the extent to which a theory
“enable[s] us to say significant things, generate[s] insights, and ha[s]
implications for future research.”51 Of course it is not right to say that
legal theory cannot generate predictive hypotheses. The literature on the
attitudinal model of judicial decision making, which tests the hypothesis
that proxies for judges’ political views (such as the party of the appointing
president), is widely viewed as a robust and successful predictive
research program.52 This shows that legal theory can spur empirical
research—the attitudinal model was prompted and supported by the
theoretical claim of the American Legal Realists and others that legal
reasons alone are insufficient to explain many judicial decisions. 53 The
abstractness of norms like SPT means that positing them has little
predictive power in itself—without more, the hypothesis that SPT is
accepted predicts some constellation of judicial actions aimed at
preventing state interference with the constitutional structure. That is
what we see, but these observations are not terribly surprising and do not
crisply distinguish the SPT view from other explanations. Yet, the thinnorms theory frames more determinate and testable hypotheses. For
example, the argument that SPT is implemented by a variety of doctrines
whose differences are attributable to non-legal considerations is more
fruitful: we could design experiments to test the likely causal power of
various instrumental or other non-legal factors in doctrinal formulation;
we would just need to find reliable proxies for things like judges’ concern
about institutional capital, interbranch conflicts, adjudicatory error rates,

ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 44–115 (2002) (presenting the attitudinal model of judicial
decision making that tests for the causal power of non-legal reasons in adjudication).
50. Id.
51. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1053; accord Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321; PETER LIPTON,
INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 34 (2004).
52. Cf. Rob Robinson, Does Prosecutorial Experience “Balance Out” a Judge’s Liberal
Tendencies?, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 143, 144 (2011) (arguing that “the ‘attitudinal model’ has proven
remarkably robust in explaining much of the aggregate variance in appellate decisions” compared
to other models measuring the influence of social background factors); Pauline T. Kim, Lower
Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405–07 (2007) (arguing that the attitudinal model is
incomplete; articulating various critiques and concluding that law’s independent normative force
explains many judicial decisions).
53. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
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among others.54
There exists broad and long-lived consensus among scientists and
philosophers of science on the foregoing criteria being generally
correct.55 There appears to be no such consensus with respect to the
propriety of some set of normative values of the kind that Fallon and
Bartrum propose for choosing among normative constitutional theory
theses (for example, democracy, rule of law, judicial constraint,
substantive justice, and so forth).56 If we agree that robust consensus on
theory selection is the best approximation of objectivity available, there
is substantially more robust consensus with respect to the criteria I have
mentioned for distinguishing scientific, social scientific, and descriptive
constitutional theory claims—enough consensus for Kuhn to suggest that
scientific theory selection decisions on these criteria can, over time,
approach objectivity.57 The selection process I have outlined here,
accordingly, does not suffer from the kind of instability that I argue
threatens proposals for normative constitutional theory assessment.
One conventionally cited criterion for assessing scientific theories—
Karl Popper’s idea of falsifiability58—is occasionally mentioned in legal
scholarship59 and, of course, frequently discussed in judicial decisions
involving the Daubert test for the reliability of expert testimony. 60
Falsifiability is, however, both contested among philosophers of science
and a poor fit for legal theory.61 A scientific proposition is falsifiable if
a statement about some occurrence is incompatible with the
proposition;62 science on Popper’s view should proceed by “conjecture
and refutation” in which proposed explanations for observed phenomena
are tested not for conformance with corroborating evidence but by
54. Of course, the truth of statements in responses to survey questions like this or, for example,
“Do you accept SPT as obligatory even if you would not be sanctioned for violating it,” that capture
Hart’s idea of the internal point of view, will generate answers that are ultimately unverifiable. But
that is an epistemic problem facing all survey evidence; we will have to use the best evidence rule
and wait to be disproved.
55. Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321.
56. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
57. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 325.
58. See generally POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 23.
59. See supra note 23 (canvassing legal scholars’ treatment of Popper’s view).
60. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); see Susan Haack, Federal
Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction—and a Reconstruction, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 394,
417–27 (2010) (canvassing federal court treatments of Popper’s view under Daubert).
61. By the time Popper was cited in Daubert, his views had been for the most part abandoned
by mainstream philosophers of science. See, e.g., Haack, supra note 60, at 415–16; David Stove,
Cole Porter and Karl Popper: The Jazz Age in the Philosophy of Science, in AGAINST THE IDEALS
OF THE AGE 3–8 (Roger Kimball ed., 1999); D.H. Mellor, The Popper Phenomenon, 52 PHIL. 195
(1977).
62. POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 23, at 86–87.
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subjecting test after test designed to falsify the proposed explanation.63
Falsifiability was Popper’s proposed criterion for demarcating real
science from other kinds of pursuits that purport to be scientific (for
instance, Popper argued that the latter category includes metaphysics,
psychoanalysis, history, and so forth).64 Popper held other extreme views
about science, including that science does not use inductive logic
(because inductive logic cannot truly confirm any proposition as true),
and that observation does not justify belief in the reality of what is
observed.65
Aside from these internecine struggles within the philosophy of
science, there are reasons to hold falsifiability particularly inappropriate
as a criterion for assessing competing constitutional theory claims. The
first problem is that falsifiability as a way to distinguish science from
other forms of inquiry is inapt for assessing constitutional theory claims
that do not purport to be scientific, but merely descriptive of the artifacts
of human practice. Another problem is the following: Assuming that
constitutional norms are meaningfully constituted (validated) by patterns
of convergent official practice of acceptance, then for claims of the form
“Proposition X is a constitutional norm in system Y,” potentially
falsifying counterexamples (e.g., a judicial decision in which the court
upholds some state action that pretty clearly threatens structural stability)
could be interpreted as either (1) proof that Proposition X is not in fact a
norm of the system; or (2) evidence that Proposition X was (or perhaps
still is) a norm of the system but that the official consensus that X is a
norm is changing or has changed. It is not obvious how, absent explicit
judicial specification, we should decide between these two
interpretations. But it is possible in principle for SPT to be falsified by,
say, an unambiguous judicial statement that it has never been a valid
norm.
C. Normative Theory Assessment
This is the hard part. The vast majority of constitutional theory is
normative, but this is the most difficult kind of theory for which to do
metatheory. Existing literature suggests normative criteria that are
themselves at issue in the debates between competing theories, and that
will not work, at least not without more.
Again, start with their purpose: to make some improvement that

63. Id. at 30–33.
64. See id. at 40; KARL R. POPPER, UNENDED QUEST: AN INTELLECTUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY
38–41 (rev ed. 1976).
65. See POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 23, at 102–05.
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maximizes some value. So the general purpose is to give an account on
which values are maximized. The metatheoretical question, then, is
“which value is preferable to maximize” (for example, should we prefer
justice, or should we seek a balance between liberty and justice).
The tiny literature to address this question directly suggests solving
this problem (that these criteria are essentially contested by looking for
values on which there is consensus); this resonates with Fallon’s more
general claim that constitutional legitimacy can be established by
sociological fact of consensus, but that does not solve the larger logical
problem that this is question begging. To put it abstractly, the
metatheoretical question here is which of the following two theses is best
or preferable: “We should do X to maximize value P” or “We should do
Y to maximize value Q”?
The task of metatheory here is to determine which value, P or Q, is to
be preferred when it comes to maximizing values. (Of course, there are
lots of other criteria that could be applied to distinguish normative
theories—feasibility, accuracy of the descriptive predicate, cost, sideconstraints, and so on; but here we want to assume those away as they do
not answer the more basic question-begging problem of how to evaluate
competing value claims). I do not want to suggest that there is an answer
here—Bartrum and Fallon suggest consensus, but that is not good enough
as the question “which is more important, freedom or justice,” is one for
which it is not obvious that “whichever everyone agrees is more
important” is the best answer (even if everyone does, in fact, so agree).
This is the old debate about whether there are moral truths or, in fact,
morality is only relative.
Even reading Fallon’s claim that most constitutional theorists agree on
this set of normative criteria as a kind of descriptive sociological claim
that there exists a convergent practice among legal officials and
practitioners, it is not obvious that the claim is true or what its
significance would be if it were true. Bartrum says something similar:
“‘constitutional values’ . . . [or] the important or essential purposes we
ascribe to the Constitution within our democratic structure . . . can
provide some objective grounds to assess particular theory choices, even
if the ultimate act of decision remains essentially subjective.”66 By
“objective” here, he must mean something like “consistent with a broad
and deep consensus of legal officials and the public”—and, indeed, he
characterizes these “constitutional values” that provide the evaluative
criteria as reflected in “extra-constitutional texts that have settled most
deeply into our interpretive practice—under the hypothesis that those
66. Bartrum, supra note 6, at 264 (emphasis added).
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texts are canonical precisely because they speak forcefully to widely held
ideas about what the Constitution means or how it should function.”67
These claims alone are not evidence of the indicated consensus—and
other theorists persuasively argue against the generality and durability of
a consensus on constitutional values among either theorists or judges and
practitioners.68 In addition, it is not clear that these sorts of values can be
applied in a determinate enough way to serve as crisp criteria for
distinguishing among competing theories.
Bartrum’s suggestion
resonates in a general way with my view—I agree that we should seek
consensus because, at the end of the day, consensus is what establishes
whatever approximates the true facts of the matter of legal phenomena. I
just disagree that a sufficiently robust and definite consensus may be
found on questions of political morality. Even superficial agreement that
recommendations for constitutional decision making should promote
democracy seems likely to generate significant disagreement; such a
standard would invite essential contestation on, among other things, the
aspects of democracy (accountability, participation, actual actions
reflecting majoritarian preferences, etc.) that should be maximized.69
It might be that this kind of normative assessment is simply
unavoidable in constitutional theory. There is a fairly strong intuitive
impulse toward this conclusion; and constitutional theory work is
overwhelmingly normative.70
My own view, however, is that
constitutional theory is not inescapably normative. While the lack of
descriptive constitutional theory might tell us something about the
scholarly community’s implicit assessment of such work’s value—more
likely, I think, it tells us something about what the community finds
interesting71—it does not establish that descriptive theory is somehow
67. Id. at 265.
68. See Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
149, 149–50 (2004) (“When the ideological valence of Supreme Court decisions shifts,
constitutional theorizing about judicial review tends to shift as well. Over the last century or more
there have been two general positions taken about judicial review: that it is a blight in a democratic
system that must be curtailed and that it is a valued part of U.S. government essential to the
protection of constitutional liberty. . . . Progressives and conservatives have advanced both
positions (in various permutations) at different times, depending upon which position seemed most
apt to present circumstances, given their political views.”); Dorf, supra note 20, at 603–05 (arguing
that the appearance of consensus on the values Fallon points up is largely illusory).
69. See Dorf, supra note 20, at 603–04 (“[A]greement (at a very high level of generality) about
the constitutional values identified by Fallon pales in significance when contrasted with the
disagreement about particulars.”).
70. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 540–41.
71. Cf. Gardner, supra note 18, at 202–03 (“[B]y itself [legal positivism’s core claim] does not
point in favor of or against doing anything at all. . . . When a philosopher of law asserts a
proposition that neither endorses nor criticizes what they do, but only identifies some necessary
feature of what they do, lawyers and law teachers are often frustrated . . . [and] automatically start
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impossible. Normative constitutional theories of course differ from
scientific theories in just the way that I have mentioned—normative
theories purport to establish what should be the case; scientific theories
purport to explain what is the case. Normative constitutional theory, then,
cannot “coerce agreement” in the same way that we like to think that
scientific theories can.72 If one disagrees with the evaluative proposition
driving the normative proposal (e.g., constitutionalism should be more
democratic as a driver for “popular constitutionalist” proposals for
reforming judicial review73), the proposal itself cannot change one’s
mind because it presupposes agreement with the underlying evaluative
claim.
We need more work on these questions of normative theory
assessment, and along different lines than what exists—consensus alone
(for example, if a consensus arose that justice-seeking constitutionalism
is the correct view of how our theoretical claims about constitutionalism
or constitutional development should be formulated) without a showing
that consensus is or should be the single criterion for prioritizing
competing value systems. Demonstrating that is a very deep task, and
one for another day. For the moment, and for our purposes, is it enough
to note that normative theory assessment is a project that can proceed,
along the foregoing lines. This suggests that we might, at some point,
actually arrive at some criterion or set of criteria P on the basis of which
we might sort through normative constitutional theory claims and assign
them their relative merits in a manner more comprehensive, systematic,
and consistent with the best-going account of scientific theory
assessment.
II. ASSESSING THE ANTI-EVASION THESES
Now, I will demonstrate the broad applicability of the metatheoretical
insights developed above by applying them to a relatively new, and quite
technical, debate among competing narrow theses in constitutional
theory. The debate was sparked by Brannon Denning and Michael Kent’s
argument in an important recent article that some rules of constitutional
to search for hidden notes of endorsement or criticism, secret norms that they are being asked to
follow. . . . They cannot accept that legal philosophy is not wholly (or even mainly) the backroom
activity of identifying what is good or bad about legal practice . . . . In this fundamentally antiphilosophical climate, a thesis like [legal positivism’s core claim], which is inertly informative, is
bound to become egregiously distorted.”).
72. See Posner, supra note 1, at 4; Bartrum, supra note 6, at 272–73 (highlighting differences
between normative constitutional theories of adjudication and scientific theories).
73. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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doctrine can be usefully distinguished from the standard category of
“constitutional decision rules” developed in what we might call
“metadoctrinal” constitutional theory over the last fifteen years. Put
roughly, the metadoctrinal approach treats constitutional doctrine—the
rules, tests, and standards courts adopt to identify violations of
constitutional permissions, prohibitions, or requirements—as a distinct
and important subject of research and analysis. 74 Denning and Kent’s
article is a project with which I am sympathetic; and there is much about
their description of constitutional doctrine that seems unquestionably
correct. The discussion in this Part is meant to demonstrate that the
theory assessment criteria developed above are useful not just at a very
high level of abstraction—as, for example, in judging between competing
theories of the nature of law—but at a finer grain as well. To that end, I
will examine both the broad and the narrow theses advanced in Denning
and Kent’s work along the theory assessment criteria developed in Part I.
Denning and Kent clearly accept metadoctrinalism’s “two-output
thesis” (“TOT”),75 specifically: “‘there exists a conceptual distinction
between two sorts of judicial work product each of which is integral to
the functioning of constitutional adjudication,’ namely judge-interpreted
constitutional meaning [or constitutional operative propositions] and
judge-crafted tests bearing an instrumental relationship to that meaning
[or constitutional decision rules].”76 The authors’ description and
examination of Anti-Evasion Doctrines (“AEDs”) is an exercise in
applied metadoctrinal theory. They identify as AEDs rules of
constitutional doctrine of the following form: “X violates constitutional
requirement Θ even though X satisfies doctrinal rule, test, or standard Y,
where Y also purports to identify violations of Θ.”77 In addition to
highlighting examples of doctrines taking this form in a wide variety of
constitutional contexts, the authors advance the following core claims:
(1) There exist certain constitutional decision rules—AEDs—that are
conceptually distinct from standard constitutional decision rules in one or

74. See Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L.
REV. F. 220, 220 (2006) [hereinafter Berman, Rights]; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decisions Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 2, 4 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Rules] (“Insofar as this strain of
scholarship concerns itself with the fact of doctrine but not with its particular content, we may fairly
term it metadoctrinal.”).
75. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitutional
Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1775, 1818–21.
76. Berman, Rights, supra note 74, at 221 (quoting Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 36).
77. An example of this form is rational basis review for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation; this kind of discrimination probably violates the Equal Protection Clause, but almost
always satisfies rational basis review—the doctrinal test courts use to identify constitutional
violations in this context.
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more of the following senses: logical structure (they are always structured
differently than standard decision rules); logical priority (they are
analytically subsequent to some standard decision rule(s)); function (they
supplement standard decision rules rather than replace them); or
justification (they are adopted for reasons distinct from the instrumental
considerations that bear on the implementation of constitutional operative
propositions, which shape standard decision rules). Call this the
Distinctiveness Thesis (“DT”). (2) Identifying and distinguishing AEDs
as a category of constitutional decision rules yields theoretical benefits
beyond the merely taxonomical—that is, beyond merely adding another
more-or-less correct bit of nuance to our positive account of
constitutional doctrine on the metadoctrinal model. Call this the Value
Thesis (“VT”).
Denning and Kent’s identification of AEDs across doctrinal areas is an
impressive contribution in itself—metadoctrinal theory takes transsubstantive doctrinal analysis as an important office. Now one and a half
decades old78—and with still older analytical precursors79—it is a mature
branch of constitutional theory in the sense that its methodology and
objectives have been thoroughly explored and defended.80 But it is also
a field in which much substantive work remains to be done, and thus it is
worth assessing Denning & Kent’s contribution as it relates to the broader
methods and aims of the metadoctrinal program. In Section A, I assess
DT by exploring what, exactly, Denning and Kent have identified that is
new or previously under-examined. Because DT’s truth is a premise of
VT, if DT is in some sense true, then VT is likely true. I leave it to others,
however, to evaluate VT in greater detail. In Section B, I examine several
deeper questions raised by the authors’ AED-identification project and
evaluate metadoctrinal theory’s capacity to generate answers.
Completion of this examination revels that another of Denning and
Kent’s contributions is to highlight some of metadoctrinalism’s limits.

78. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) (widely recognized as the formative work in modern
metadoctrinal theory).
79. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
80. See generally Berman, Rules, supra note 74. See also Pursley, supra note 34, at 502–12
(2012); Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 417, 424–28 (2008); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the
Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655–86 (2005), all of which explore
the theory before applying it to various specific doctrinal controversies.
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A. Anti-Evasion’s Distinctiveness
First, I want to clarify Denning and Kent’s Distinctiveness Thesis.
Here, I will examine whether they have identified a conceptually distinct
category of constitutional doctrine. I then turn to consider whether they
have identified a previously under-examined factor in judicial reasoning
concerning doctrinal formulation. The latter possibility turns out to be
more plausible and therefore is more likely an accurate statement of
Denning and Kent’s core claim.
1. Taxonomy and Conceptual Distinctions
Denning and Kent claim that AEDs are distinct from other forms of
constitutional doctrine, and by this they might mean any of several things:
They might mean, first, that AEDs as a form of constitutional doctrine
are conceptually distinct from constitutional operative propositions and
constitutional decision rules, the two categories of doctrine identified by
the current metadoctrinal taxonomy.81 If the goal of that taxonomic
project is to develop a full account of “the conceptual structure of
constitutional doctrine,”82 then our question should be whether Denning
and Kent have identified a doctrinal phenomenon of distinct conceptual
structure to that which has already been described in the literature.
Insight into the distinctiveness of AEDs will help to show the extent to
which Denning and Kent’s work promises to advance metadoctrinalism’s
second central aim—to leverage a robust positive account of doctrine qua
doctrine into normative advances in constitutional theory.
Metadoctrinal theorists have developed several central theses that,
taken together, help establish the properties of operative propositions and
decision rules. The most important of these theses is TOT,83 but there is
also an instrumental reasoning thesis (“IRT”), namely: “Decision rules
bear an instrumental relationship to operative propositions both in the
sense that they are designed to implement the operative proposition, and
in the sense that decision rules’ content is determined by instrumental
considerations bearing on that purpose of implementation.”84 Third, a
necessity thesis (“NT”) holds that because courts will face some degree

81. Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 4.
82. Id. at 7.
83. See supra text accompanying note 73. See generally Berman, Rights, supra note 74.
84. See Berman, Rights, supra note 74 (combining instrumental reasoning and TOT); Pursley,
supra note 34, at 506–08 (exploring this thesis); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and
Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1521–23
(2004) [hereinafter Berman, Guillen] (exploring instrumental factors that arguably shape
Commerce Clause decision rules); Roosevelt, supra note 80, at 1659–64 (paralleling Berman, but
in the equal protection context).
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of epistemic uncertainty in every case—for example, they cannot know
with perfect certainty whether Congress has drawn a race-based
distinction on the basis of unlawful animus—constitutional adjudication
always requires the formulation of a decision rule or the use of a
preexisting decision rule.85 This does not mean that every operative
proposition requires a decision rule—some operative propositions may
go unenforced. Nor does it mean that every decision rule must be
explicitly articulated by a court—some may simply operate invisibly in
the background. The default decision rule instructs courts to find a
constitutional violation if they find φ fact(s) by a preponderance of
evidence.86
Let us, then, first consider conservatism (the ability of claims to coexist
with other well-established views about the world): how well do these
AED theses fit with the central theses of metadoctrinal theory? AEDs
have all the essential properties of decision rules. They are designed to
implement constitutional operative propositions;87 they are shaped by
instrumental considerations—for example, as Denning and Kent
emphasize, AEDs often seem supported by calculations about the
adjudicatory error rate in the form of false negatives, or holdings of
constitutionality where the action actually violates the relevant operative
proposition because of imprecisely fitting decision rules, and other
considerations relevant to the accuracy and efficiency of judicial
implementation of the operative proposition. The authors draw from the
risk-regulation literature to contend that courts do and should strive for
optimal, not maximal, enforcement of constitutional operative
propositions in making doctrine; this suggests that they believe courts
may choose to adopt AEDs for instrumental reasons, consistent with
IRT.88 And as AEDs do not appear to be propositional statements of
constitutional meaning, they are likely not mislabeled operative
propositions. The authors stress that AEDs take a variety of forms—
purpose tests, effects tests, and so forth—and tend to be more standardlike than rule-like. This also does not distinguish them conceptually from
85. See Berman, Guillen, supra note 84, at 1520–21.
86. See Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 10–11. There are other theses that are not essential to
this discussion, but are central to metadoctrinalism’s contribution to constitutional theory—
including, for example, the interpretive agnosticism thesis, namely: Observing and affirming the
distinction between operative propositions and decision rules entails no commitment to any theory
of constitutional interpretation, and thus the two output thesis may be accepted by originalists and
non-originalists alike. The taxonomic value of the distinction, therefore, does not turn on resolving
irresolvable interpretive debates. See id. at 9, 57 n.192.
87. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1776, 1793 (arguing AEDs implement constitutional
principles).
88. See id. at 1797–99 (discussing risk regulation).
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other decision rules: The point of metadoctrinal taxonomy is to categorize
doctrines by their structure, rather than by their content; and the standard
decision rules category also includes all manner of bright-line rules,
balancing tests, levels of scrutiny, and so forth. They are all decision
rules because they implement operative propositions and are shaped by
instrumental concerns related to that implementation. Examining AEDs’
specific content is certainly relevant to doctrinal analysis, or “thick
description,” but it is not relevant to metadoctrinal taxonomy.89 AEDs
are conceptually identical to primary decision rules in every sense
relevant to metadoctrinal taxonomy.
Denning and Kent claim that AEDs stand not only in the typical
implementation relationship with operative propositions, but also in a
relationship of supplementation with primary decision rules.90 Perhaps
this special relationship with regular decision rules makes AEDs
distinctive. For this to amount to a structural distinction, we would need
an argument to establish that primary decision rules do not supplement
other decision rules, at least not in the ordinary case. But there is no
argument to show that it would be in some sense incoherent to
characterize, for example, the virtually per se antidiscrimination rule and
Pike balancing test from the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as a pair
of primary (co-equal) decision rules, both of which implement the
underlying constitutional operative proposition and happen to
compliment each other in the sense that each identifies violations of the
operative proposition that the other does not.91 After all, what Denning
and Kent characterize as the primary dormant Commerce Clause decision
rules focus on discriminatory actions by one state against another, Pike
identifies unduly burdensome but non-discriminatory actions. It seems
just as apt to characterize the Pike balancing test, which weighs a state
action’s burden on interstate relations against its local benefits, as “the
second dormant Commerce Clause decision rule,” or even to suggest that
the dormant Commerce Clause is implemented with a single decision rule
containing a variety of complex conjunctions and alternatives. Denning
89. Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 6–7 (distinguishing the general logical structure of
doctrine from the question of specific doctrines); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 77 (2001) (emphasizing that his doctrinal types were “a bit of
a hodgepodge” and of little theoretical importance).
90. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1808 (stating that AEDs are “decision rules that assist
other decision rules in the implementation of operative propositions”).
91. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (virtually per se invalidity rule for
facial discrimination); Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (articulating the
catchall balancing test); see Pursley, supra note 80, at 538–44 (discussing these doctrines as
decision rules); see also Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1789–90 (characterizing the Pike test
as an AED).
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and Kent acknowledge that some decision rules do look like this—they
quote Professor Berman’s lengthy “partial stab” at stating the First
Amendment Free Speech Clause’s decision rule as an example of this
kind of complexity.92 There is nothing distinctive, then, about decision
rules that are paired with other decision rules to implement constitutional
operative propositions as a system of rules.
These observations do not necessarily undermine DT. There are yet
other potentially distinguishing features: There is the matter of how
AEDs and primary decision rules function together. Denning and Kent
argue that AEDs are distinctive insofar as they supplement, rather than
replace (or interact in some other way with) primary decision rules. This,
of course, is not unique to AEDs; a later-formulated decision rule
instructing courts to defer to Congress in a certain subset of, for example,
Equal Protection Clause disputes in which the Court typically applies a
stringent standard of review—an exception likely to produce more false
negatives, in other words—would supplement the primary decision rule
in precisely the way Denning and Kent have in mind (changing the
number and kind of violations the relevant set of decision rules identify),
but Denning and Kent would not call our hypothetical supplement an
AED as it does not increase the likelihood of identifying actual
constitutional violations.
Relatedly, it is not clear that all of the identified AEDs merely
supplement the primary decision rule(s). Some, like the later Commerce
Clause doctrines, seem to be substitutes for preexisting decision rules, as
Denning and Kent concede.93 The difference is significant in principle:
In the case of supplementation, all of the decision rules must be
considered invalid in each case and action violating the primary decision
rule but not the AED (and vice versa). In the case of substitution, only
the later-adopted decision rule need be considered and actions that violate
the earlier rule but not the later are not invalid. Indeed, in the case of
substitution, it is inapt to characterize the later rule as dealing with
“evasions” of constitutional norms by way of formal compliance with the
former rule because such compliance would yield no benefit to the actor.
Denning and Kent elide this distinction, arguing that “the ebb and flow
of constitutional adjudication tends to” go according to the
supplementation pattern that they identify.94 But this conflation calls into
question their claim that true supplementary AEDs are “ubiquitous” in

92. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules:
Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMM. 39, 39–40 (2010).
93. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1793–94.
94. Id. at 1793.
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constitutional doctrine.95 The extent to which later-added decision rules
are in fact supplementary AEDs, rather than substitute decision rules, is
an empirical question that the authors do not purport to answer. But it
suggests that the explanatory power—the consilience—of the AED
theses may be problematic.
Much the same line refutes other proffered grounds for distinction.
The authors might distinguish AEDs by their temporal relationship to
primary decision rules—some AEDs are adopted after the primary
rules—but this is historical accident that even Denning and Kent concede
cannot be significant.96 Again, consider the Equal Protection Clause
example—adding a decision rule that decreases judicial enforcement of
the relevant norm, even if it was adopted long after the primary decision
rule, would not make it an AED. It would just be a second decision rule.
So, too, the claim that AEDs tend to be “standard-like” while the primary
decision rules that they supplement tend to be more “rule-like” does not
distinguish AEDs from other constitutional decision rules, because the
category of decision rules by definition includes both rule-like and
standard-like doctrines.97 While scholars sometimes for the sake of
contrast characterize doctrine on binaries—deferential or non-deferential,
rule-like or standard-like, and so forth—few would deny that many
decision rules have characteristics that resist such simple division.98
Think, for example, of the Miranda doctrine—a rule-like primary
decision rule99—and the “substantial effects” prong of the modern
Commerce Clause doctrine—a clearly standard-like primary decision
rule.100
AEDs, then, are conceptually indistinguishable from other
constitutional decision rules on the properties we have examined so far.
That suggests that assigning them a separate category serves some
purpose other than to contribute to the metadoctrinal taxonomic
95. Id. at 1777–78.
96. See id. at 1779 n.34 (acknowledging that “it may not always be the case that the ‘other’ rules
to which AEDs respond were developed prior to the AED itself,” and “we think our analysis is the
same regardless” of the chronological facts).
97. See id. at 1801–02 (AEDs typically standard-like).
98. This is what Denning and Kent refer to as a “dualist” tendency in metadoctrinalism; I do
not think it is either as pervasive as they say and I do not think it reflects widespread
misunderstanding of the doctrine’s true complexity. See id. at 1776 (“[W]e attempt to unsettle this
[dualist] view of doctrinal design . . . .”).
99. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966); Berman, Rules, supra note
74, at 116–24 (dividing the Miranda doctrine into operative proposition and decision rule).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1996) (canonizing the now famous “items
of interstate commerce, channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or things with a
substantial relationship to interstate commerce” standard for judging the permissible reach of the
commerce power). See also Berman, supra note 84.
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project.101 That is not to say that Denning and Kent have failed to
highlight an interesting form of decision rule—AEDs surely exist in some
contexts; and drawing correct generalizations concerning their form and
functions certainly improves our understanding of constitutional practice.
It just does not add a conceptually distinct category to our metadoctrinal
taxonomy. Adding another distinction to the metadoctrinal picture is in
tension with our simplicity criterion for theory choice.
Now, finally, let us consider fruitfulness—the “test of results.” None
of Denning and Kent’s normative claims are fully undermined by the
foregoing conclusions. They claim that their account of AEDs (1) rebuts
Nagel’s critique of courts reveling in doctrine for its own sake at the
expense of careful attention to constitutional meaning;102 (2) provides
evidence for Schauer’s contention that rules and standards frequently
converge in practice as a result of actors iterative adaptations to either
form of requirement;103 and (3) provides evidence that the study of
doctrine qua doctrine is valuable in constitutional theory.104 Luckily,
none of these normative implications depend on AEDs being
conceptually distinct from constitutional decision rules—all of the
foregoing effects are created by acknowledgement of the distinction
between operative proposition and decision rule and the ubiquity of
decision rules (acceptance of TOT and NT) almost as logical entailments:
The implementing relationship between decision rules and operative
propositions demonstrates courts’ continuing attention to constitutional
norms even in the midst of complex doctrinal formulation, rebutting
Nagel’s claim.105 The well-documented existence of constitutional
decision rules that have either been changed over time from formalistic
rules to more realistic standards, that incorporate both rule-like and
standard-like components, or that are ostensibly rule-like but so riddled
by exceptions that their application is unpredictable, are striking evidence
of Schauer’s convergence thesis with no need for additional support from
AEDs in particular106—though AEDs do tend to take these convergent
101. Cf. Berman, supra note 84, at 4–5 (desiring to contribute to metadoctrinal taxonomy
project).
102. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1816, 1817–21; Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985).
103. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1816, 1826–31; Frederick Schauer, The
Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303.
104. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1816.
105. The authors apparently agree on this point; they argue that implementing doctrine vel non
rebuts Nagel’s critique. Id. at 1819–20.
106. See, e.g., Berman, Rules, supra note 75, at 61–78; Pursley, supra note 34, at 506–12, 537–
62; Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 983 (2010).
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forms.107 Rehearsing the familiar rules versus standards debate also
usefully highlights the kind of instrumental considerations that bear on
doctrinal formulation—critiques of both forms of decision rule embody
classical concerns about error rate, error cost, manageability, signaling
value, and so forth,108 which serves conservatism. And emphasizing the
importance of focusing on “the fact of doctrine” in constitutional
adjudication is a central aim of metadoctrinalism generally. But none of
this necessarily undermines the value of Denning and Kent’s catalogue
of these rules—we need to think again about the force of their
contribution.
2. The Anti-Circumvention Reason
To salvage DT, Denning and Kent likely would argue that AEDs
warrant separate treatment because they are adopted for a particular
reason—one that is complex, contestable, and not involved uniformly in
all instances of doctrinal formulation. That is, our metatheoretical
framework suggests that their argument is better read not so that AEDs
themselves are conceptually distinct from the primary decision rules that
they supplement, but rather that focusing on decision rules that take the
form of AEDs highlights an important and under-scrutinized category of
reasons that judges and justices may rely upon in doctrinal formulation.
So far, theorists have focused for the most part on the instrumental
considerations that arise upon asking “how may a constitutional norm (or
operative proposition), Θ, best be implemented?”
Here, “best
implementation” encompasses more than the goal of identifying all
violations of the norm; it includes things like minimizing interinstitutional friction, the chances of adjudicatory error, the costs of
decision, and so forth.109 These are the standard instrumental
considerations that bear on implementing constitutional operative
propositions. Denning and Kent draw our attention to another set of
considerations that might arise upon asking a slightly different question:
“How can we improve the constitutional decision rules that we have put
in place (or are planning to adopt) to implement Θ?” Denning and Kent’s
exploration of AEDs highlights the wide variety of contexts in which this
kind of reasoning might be at work in doctrinal formulation. This is
certainly something new, and it suggests that their claims may indeed be
fruitful.

107. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1826–28.
108. Id. at 1797–1813 (discussing at length the benefits and detriments of rules and standards,
among other reasons to value or doubt the value of AEDs).
109. Id. at 506–12.
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Of course, one basic concern in the formulation of decision rules is
“fit”—how to craft rules that will “catch” a large percentage of violations
of, in this instance, underlying operative proposition Θ. But this process
of reasoning will hardly ever be limited to that question—other
instrumental considerations are almost always on the table. If, for
example, an existing decision rule does a fairly good job of identifying
instances in which Congress has violated Θ, but also invites such heavy
judicial scrutiny of legislative motives that it causes significant interbranch friction, the latter characteristic of the rule could well be the one
that motivates doctrinal revision. Our hypothetical court might adopt a
supplementary rule requiring deference where certain legislative-process
conditions have been met (indicia of reasonable deliberation, for
example); concerns about “fit” or circumvention need not always be the
driving force. We must be careful, for reasons of simplicity, not to assign
any particular instrumental consideration greater weight than the others
without a theoretical justification.
But the fruitfulness of these theses is not yet entirely established.
Denning and Kent have thus highlighted a particular kind of “fit”
consideration associated with crafting decision rules that preclude
“cleverly” crafted evasions under the guise of formal compliance.110
Drawing attention to these anti-circumvention considerations is
important because, without them, conventional instrumental reasoning
would not always clearly favor adopting the decision rules that Denning
and Kent label AEDs. Grafting a standard-like supplement onto an
existing rule-like test will seem, in some contexts, inconsistent with the
relevant instrumental factors—it is likely to increase the rate of
adjudicatory error, as standards often do; it may increase decision costs
because of the increased fact-sensitivity of the hybrid rule; it may involve
weighing factors that are at the outer limits of judicial competence, as
with the assessment of state action’s “burden” on interstate commerce
required by the Pike standard; and so forth.111 Anti-circumvention
describes an underappreciated set of considerations that might justify
adopting a standard-like AED despite other instrumental deficits. Those
considerations are, however, instrumental—after all, in addition to its
similarity to the basic “fit” concern, anti-circumvention is aimed at a
particular kind of adjudicatory error, that of allowing “constitutional
principles to be undermined by subterfuge and artifice.”112 It remains
110. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1778–80.
111. See Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Pursley, supra note 34, at 506–
12 (canvassing instrumental determinants of doctrine); see also Denning & Kent, supra note 78, at
1804–07 (acknowledging these and other problems with standard-like AEDs generally).
112. Denning & Kent, supra note 78, at 1804.
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unclear what weight courts should assign anti-circumvention
consideration in the doctrinal calculation.
Furthermore, it is not obvious that every decision rule labeled here and
AED depends primarily on the anti-circumvention factor. For at least
some decision rules that look like AEDs, a different instrumental
justification is possible. The Pike balancing test might be the background
decision rule of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine—it certainly is the
most capacious—and it might raise institutional competence concerns
serious enough to warrant adopting the more formalistic dormant
Commerce Clause doctrines, virtually a per se invalidity rule for facial
discrimination, to reduce the risk of adjudicatory error.113 The anticircumvention concern, then, is not necessary to a plausible explanation
of every doctrine classifiable as an AED. This is a simplicity problem.
Yet, it is beyond question that Denning and Kent have identified a kind
of implementation-related concern that might—and probably frequently
does—bear on doctrinal formulation in various contexts. And a focused
analysis of the reasons on which courts rely in doctrinal formulation, or
a subset of those reasons, fills a continuing gap in the metadoctrinal
literature. Again, fruitfulness here is an attractive reason to consider the
AED account. Fallon, for example, recently examined the role of
concerns about “judicially manageable standards” in doctrinal
formulation.114 As a study of reasons for doctrinal choice, these theses
seem capable of adding quite a bit to the research program.
B. Anti-Evasion, Constitutional Operative Propositions, and Norms
Now, we examine the fruitfulness—the explanatory power—of this
view in greater detail. The idea of anti-circumvention reasons for
formulating decision rules is powerful, has a great deal of intuitive
appeal, and is a novel contribution to the metadoctrinal literature. But
metadoctrinal theorists also seek to leverage taxonomic insights to
answer deep questions at the heart of constitutional theory. Roosevelt
uses the TOT and an analysis of the relationship between decision rules
and potential operative propositions in certain constitutional rights
contexts to draw deeper lessons about the legitimacy of judicial review in
constitutional cases;115 Berman uses the distinction to lay bare the full
range of reasons courts might consider in deciding constitutional
cases;116 and I examine existing decision rules to formulate and test
113. See sources cited supra note 91.
114. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006).
115. See generally Roosevelt, supra note 80.
116. See, e.g., Berman, Rules, supra note 74; Berman, supra note 84; Mitchell N. Berman,
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hypotheses about the content of the constitutional norms that actually
operate in our system in areas where the norms are obscure;117 among
others. Other deep questions on which metadoctrinal analysis might
provide leverage include questions about the nature and extent of
constitutional obligation; the proper role of courts and other government
institutions in the process of constitutional development and
implementation; the real reasons for judicial decisions and the legitimacy
of those reasons; and the legitimacy of judicial over- and
underenforcement of constitutional norms. Here, I want to briefly
address a number of these deep questions raised by Denning and Kent’s
work.
1. Classificatory Certainty
Examining factors bearing on the level of confidence we might have
in Denning and Kent’s identification of specific decision rules as AEDs
presents two of these deeper questions; at least insofar as there seems to
be a problem. Denning and Kent provide an extensive catalogue and
analysis of a great many doctrines they say are, in fact, AEDs. But are
they really? Can we be certain? There seem to be two possible criteria
of reliability, based on the definition of an AED that we have sketched—
a test of cause and a test of function. We might be confident that a
decision rule is an AED if there are compelling reasons to believe that it
was adopted based on the anti-circumvention concern; we might also be
confident of AED status if we knew with certainty that it implements the
underlying operative proposition in a manner that supplements the
primary decision rules by catching one or more of those “clever” attempts
to subvert the operative proposition despite formal compliance with the
primary decision rules. However, both approaches run up against
significant conceptual questions that Denning and Kent do not attempt to
answer. Those answers may well be beyond the ken of metadoctrinal
theory generally.
2. The Question of Operative Propositions
Another way in which the AED account may fail on the simplicity
criterion has to do with AEDs’ relationship to constitutional operative
propositions. Denning and Kent’s definition requires that the AED bear
a particular relationship to the operative proposition—implementing it by
identifying violations that are instances of “formal” compliance with
existing decision rules but also are “cleverly concealed” violations of the

Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2005).
117. See generally Pursley, supra note 34.
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operative proposition—that is, violations that would not be identified as
violations by the primary decision rule(s).118 There is a logical difficulty
with simultaneously distinguishing AEDs from primary decision rules
and characterizing them as implementing operative propositions. Taking
TOT and IRT as true, it seems that AEDs must either implement the
operative proposition in the standard way and thus be indistinguishable
from other decision rules, rendering the authors’ distinction artificial; or
AEDs must also stand in a relationship with other parts of constitutional
doctrine that is not one of conventional operative-proposition
implementation. Denning and Kent maintain that they do—AEDs are
aimed at a specific subset of operative-proposition violations, those that
comply with the letter of the primary decision rule but nevertheless
violate the operative proposition. Indeed, the authors define AEDs as
decision rules that do in fact implement constitutional operative
propositions in this special sense. But how do they determine whether
the violations identified by the AED are fairly characterized as operativeproposition violations? Might they be conventional decision rules
implementing operative propositions in the conventional way? Or, might
they be designed to identify “cleverly concealed” violations not of the
operative proposition, but of other decision rules—“catching” actions
that follow the letter of the rule but betray its spirit? Much turns on the
answer.
The authors must and do rely heavily on assumed operative
propositions in categorizing doctrines as AEDs. For example, in the
dormant Commerce Clause context, they formulate the operative
proposition as: “States may not interfere with interstate commerce in
ways that undermine or inhibit national political unity.”119 From this,
they reason that the virtually per se invalidity decision rule applicable to
facial discrimination overenforces the operative proposition (presumably
because there may be instances of facial discrimination against out-ofstate commerce that does not adversely effect “national political unity”);
and they contend that the broader and “more lenient” Pike balancing test
is an AED—a bad one, they argue, but an AED nonetheless—that “aids
in eliminating covert discrimination” so well hidden that it would not be
identified as discriminatory in virtue of purpose effects by other dormant
Commerce Clause decision rules that Denning and Kent also characterize

118. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1796 (“AEDs typically are decision rules fashioned as
standards that, in turn, ensure that governmental officials cannot easily evade or undermine
constitutional principles by formal compliance with rule-like decision rules implementing those
constitutional commands.”).
119. Id. at 1776–77.
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as AEDs.120 Pike, on this line, is an AED because it identifies state
commercial actions that might “undermine national political unity” by
covertly discriminating against out of state commerce and because it
“catches” operative-proposition violations that the discriminationfocused decision rules would miss. It both implements the operative
proposition and supplements the other decision rules.
Now notice the obvious problem with stipulating operativeproposition content. Denning and Kent’s proposed dormant Commerce
Clause operative proposition is plausible—compelling, even—but it is
not the only one. The constitutional basis for the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine is hotly contested, even as some version of the doctrine
has been on the books for nearly two centuries.121 That is so in part
because (1) operative propositions are not always clearly distinguishable
from decision rules;122 (2) operative propositions are not always
articulated even where their decision rules are applied;123 and (3)
operative propositions are products of constitutional interpretation, which
itself is riven by an insoluble methodological debate.124 Some decision
rules, then, may constitute incompletely theorized agreements on how to
implement operative propositions on whose content judges or justices
disagree.125 Denning and Kent offer no interpretive arguments for their
dormant Commerce Clause operative proposition here (although Denning
defends it at length in earlier articles126). If we change our assumed
120. Id. at 1810–11. Elsewhere, I have characterized the discriminatory purpose and
discriminatory effects tests as corollaries of the virtually per se rule—a single antidiscrimination
decision rule with three “prongs.” I find this characterization simpler and consistent with the cases;
but the difference is of little importance here. Pursley, supra note34, at 538–39.
121. See Pursley, supra note 34, at 498–500 (canvassing debate); id. at 543–44 (noting other
operative propositions proposed to explain dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); Denning, supra
note 80, at 478–86. Current Supreme Court Justices have argued publicly that the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is illegitimate, “an unjustified judicial intervention.” Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Tracey, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). On the dormant Commerce
Clause’s age, arguably the first Supreme Court decisions to treat the Commerce Clause a limitation
of state power were the hoary Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188–89, 209 (1824), and
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829); see Norman R. Williams,
Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1398 (2004); Denning, supra note 81, at 428–29.
122. Pursley, supra note 34, at 506–12, 530–31.
123. Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 59.
124. Id. at 9 (explaining that operative propositions are interpretive by definition); Pursley,
supra note 34, at 536–37 (interpretive debates may be unresolvable). See generally Mitchell N.
Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (noting literally dozens of forms of
originalism and charting myriad dimensions of interpretive disagreement).
125. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995)
(suggesting that well-functioning legal systems produce incomplete theorized agreements despite
disagreement on fundamental principles).
126. See Denning, supra note 81, at 484–87 n.382. (arguing that the Commerce Clause restricts
state actions through taxing or regulation that would undermine political union). See generally
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operative proposition to “states may not take actions that threaten to
undermine the constitutional structure,” then the Pike balancing test could
well be the primary or default decision rule—a straightforward judicial
assessment of the degree of state interference with other states and its
justifiability. And the antidiscrimination decision rule(s) might have
been formulated to make it easier for courts to invalidated certain kinds
of state action that are highly likely to have impermissibly destabilizing
effects.127 Fit—or consilience—in other words, may be a problem.
Metadoctrinal taxonomy is a powerful tool for mapping the conceptual
structure of the doctrine that we have, but it does not really tell us much
about why we have that doctrine and no other. The theory is
interpretively inert and thus gives no direct guidance on the content of
operative propositions.128 But by identifying decision rules and
distinguishing them, it does give us a new way to come at the problem
without wading through the morass of interpretive theory—an approach
that is important because the debates among advocates of competing
theories of constitutional interpretation may well be unresolvable. This
powerfully suggests fruitfulness.
3. Claims About Decision Rule Types
Now, let us move down one level of abstraction and work through the
implications of these metatheoretical criteria to the process of developing
claims within the confines of the metadoctrinal debate. To move beyond
taxonomic results, we may use a straightforward hypothesis-testing
program.129 Denning and Kent must test the assumed operative
propositions on which they base their AED designations against
conventional accounts of the relevant operative propositions and other
plausible hypotheses. To choose among competing explanatory theories,
recall: the simpler explanation is preferable to the more complex; the
most capacious explanation is preferable to those that explain less of the
relevant phenomena; and the explanation that leaves more of our wellsettled views about the world intact is preferable to those that displace
many such views. These criteria are cumulative—a great deal more
simplicity may offset some displacement of well-settled beliefs;

Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the
Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37 (2005) (detailing state
discrimination against interstate commerce during the Confederate-era).
127. I make the case for this operative proposition and decision rule scheme at length elsewhere.
See generally Pursley, supra note 34.
128. See discussion and sources cited supra note 84.
129. See, e.g., Pursley, supra note 34, at 530–32 (discussing an explanatory hypothesis for the
existence of all the dormancy doctrines).

15_PURSLEY FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)(DO NOT DELETE)

1368

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 47

explaining most or all of the phenomena may offset some complexity;
and so forth.130 For example, to determine whether the Pike standard and
other dormant Commerce Clause decision rules are in fact AEDs requires
knowing what the operative proposition is; to know that, we might test
Denning and Kent’s hypothetical operative proposition against my
version, or others, on these theoretical desiderata.
Without greater certainty about the content of operative propositions—
in other words, without a better account of the constitutional norms that
we have—we cannot verify AED designations and accordingly must at
least bracket Denning and Kent’s claim that AEDs are ubiquitous.
Real Reasons—The concepts of anti-evasion and anti-anti-evasion are
at least in one sense familiar. One might reformulate Denning and Kent’s
central question as: why does some doctrine rest on formalistic
distinctions and characterizations of government action while other
doctrine asks more realistically after the causes and effects of such
action? Or, as Denning and Kent phrase it in their follow-on piece: “Why
does the court sometimes engage in ‘anti-evasion’”—rejecting AEDs—
“and other times decline to do so?”131 This is a perennial question of
constitutional theory; one usually phrased as a question of why courts
choose to take a formalist or functionalist approach in various
adjudicatory contexts.132 Accordingly, we wonder why the Court shifted
from formalistic inquiries into Congress’s true purposes giving way to a
functionalist approach with a significantly greater degree of deference to
Congress in Commerce Clause cases;133 why it moved from formalist
motive tests to a more functionalist acceptance of hypothetical rational
government purposes in First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause
cases;134 and so forth. Denning and Kent contribute by taking this
problem and others like it and generalizing them by fitting them into the
metadoctrinal framework. But the question remains difficult: what are
the real reasons on the basis of which courts decide cases and formulate
doctrines as they do? To identify AEDs with certainty where we do not
130. Leiter, supra note 2, at 1239–40 (citing W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF
64–82 (2d ed. 1978); Thagard, supra note 24.
131. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Anti-Evasion in Constitutional Law, 41
FLA. ST. L. REV. 397, 423 (2014).
132. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987) (discussing formalist
versus functional approach in the context of separation of powers).
133. Compare, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918), and Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303–08 (1936), with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
134. Compare, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), with Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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know the content of the operative proposition, we must have reason to
conclude that the decision rule was, in fact, adopted based on the anticircumvention concern.
Assuming that we will have trouble identifying the precise operative
propositions that many decision rules implement, we would naturally turn
in our project of identifying the true AEDs to the test of cause; that is, the
question of judicial reasons for doctrinal selection. How can we
determine whether putative AEDs are in fact motivated by the anticircumvention concern rather than some other reason(s)? We might,
following the authors, hypothesize that they are AEDs after observing the
circumstances surrounding their adoption, the timing, their scope,
content, and relationship to other decision rules. But judicial adoption of
some decision rules that Denning and Kent characterize as AEDs and
Anti-Anti-Evasion Doctrines (“AAEDs”) on grounds of the
circumvention concern can be explained, alternatively, as the result of
other instrumental calculations. Return to the dormant Commerce Clause
example. If we accept Denning and Kent’s assumed operative
proposition,135 we still might characterize Pike as the default decision
rule that best “fits” the norm—weighing out-of-state effects against local
benefits seems like one fairly straightforward, if basic, way to roughly
assess a state action’s tendency to undermine political union. The
instrumental reasons to adopt such a rule initially might include its close
fit with the operative propositions (there are no hard proxies to limit the
range of actions potentially invalidated) and the high costs of
adjudicatory error in the form of false negatives, which could include the
actual destabilization of interstate peace. But because of its imprecision
and the complexity of the factors that courts must weigh in their
application, Pike also imposes significant decision costs and, because of
its fact sensitivity, provides very little signaling value. If state
discrimination against out-of-state commerce is a fair proxy for political
destabilization—and post-Revolutionary War interstate economic crises
suggest that this is so—then discrimination-oriented decision rules could
reduce decision costs and, if it turns out that most litigated dormant
Commerce Clause challenges involve some form of discrimination,
reduce the rate of false-positive errors. Cooley’s “national/local subject”
test was an early precursor of Pike136—as Denning himself explained,
135. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text; see also Denning & Kent, supra note 75,
at 1775–76 (introducing the constitutional operative proposition).
136. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (“[W]hatever subjects of
[the Commerce] power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress.”).
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quoting Taney Court historian Carl Swisher: Cooley’s decision rule
required courts to answer quite Pike-like “questions of degree, questions
of the extent of local need measured against the effects of local laws on
interstate commerce.”137 Thus it is not implausible to hypothesize that
Pike functions as the modern equivalent of the most basic and closefitting dormant Commerce Clause decision rule.
Once again we have competing plausible accounts of the reasons the
Court might have relied upon in adopting certain decision rules—one that
is consistent with characterizing those rules as AEDs, and one that
suggests they are merely standard decision rules. Metadoctrinal theory,
thus far, provides no criteria for distinguishing the correct set of reasons
from among competing accounts; indeed, that may be an issue that no
branch of legal theory yet can resolve. The American Legal Realists
suggested that courts do not make decisions based on legal reasons—at
least not without also considering various non-legal reasons.138 Political
theorists now work to quantify the extent to which political views affect
judicial decision making.139 From the metadoctrinal viewpoint, the best
we can do to demonstrate the most plausible account of courts’ real
reasons for choosing particular doctrinal formulations is to test the
competing explanatory hypotheses. Denning and Kent offer one such
hypothesis on this topic—that this cluster of doctrines is best explained
as resulting from courts prioritizing the anti-circumvention concern in
their instrumental reasoning. They do not, however, test that hypothesis
against competing accounts such as my error-cost calculation account,
sketched above. Again, the authors’ project seems unfinished.
***

There is a related problem. When courts conflate decision rules with
operative propositions they may unwittingly design AEDs to prevent
circumvention of the decision rule rather than the operative
proposition.140 Roosevelt calls this “calcification” of doctrine—the
doctrine becomes, through conflation and force of precedent, the de facto
operative proposition.141 In many cases the distinction between
137. Denning, supra note 80, at 437 (quoting 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD,
1836–64, at 422 (1974)).
138. See generally Brian R. Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, in
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007).
139. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998);
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 49.
140. See, e.g., Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1810 (speculating that Pike may have resulted
from such confusion).
141. Roosevelt, supra note 80, at 1692–93; see also Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1808–
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thwarting circumvention of operative propositions and precluding
circumvention of decision rules will not make much difference—
circumvention of the decision rule also will be circumvention of the
operative proposition. But they are not necessarily coextensive. Decision
rules that over- or underenforce their operative propositions will of
necessity create false positives or false negatives (the operative
proposition will sweep more broadly or more narrowly than the decision
rule in these cases); either way, circumvention of the decision rule may
not circumvent the operative proposition and vice versa.142 There is
reason to worry that judges and justices might conflate the two—as
Denning and Kent concede and I have just argued, operative propositions
can be hard to separate from decision rules for a number of reasons.143
They further concede that making identification of AEDs depend on both
their relationship to operative propositions and their relationship to the
primary decision rules increases the likelihood that courts and
commentators may treat decision rules like operative propositions. The
AED inquiry, after all, frames analysis of the operative proposition in
terms of the kinds of violations that the primary decision rule(s) were
designed to identify but do not because of an insufficiently precise
decision rule. I have demonstrated that the relationship between AEDs
and the underlying constitutional operative propositions is not as clear as
the authors suppose. An intense judicial focus on the risk of doctrinal
circumvention (what Denning and Kent call “doctrinal arbitrage”144),
combined with uncertainty about the content of operative propositions
seems to make the task of judicial AED formulation (and scholarly AED
identification) a recipe for calcification. And calcification creates
legitimacy problems.
Denning and Kent acknowledge that holding other government actors
to decision rules outside the adjudicatory context is problematic: it is not
clear that decision rules are legitimately binding on anyone beyond the
parties to a particular case; and it is not obvious that it would be desirable
for Congress and the Executive to treat decision rules like binding
12 (discussing the calcification problem).
142. See Sager, supra note 79 (positing underenforcement); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic
Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 123
(1985) (treating the concept of overenforcement as identical to that of a prophylactic rule); cf. David
A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 191 (1988) (discussing
broader concept of prophylactic rules). See generally Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 30–50
(exploring prophylactic rules and the concept of underenforcement at length).
143. See Denning & Kent, supra 75, at 1778 (“[A] focus on decision rules can obscure the
principle the rules were meant to enforce, with the result that the doctrinal tail wags the
constitutional dog.”).
144. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1801–02 (discussing “doctrinal arbitrage”).
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constitutional directives.145 But the debate is far from settled—there are
arguments for treating decision rules as more or less binding beyond the
four corners of the case. Denning and Kent contend that AEDs promote
“substantive fairness”—the value associated with allowing people “not
merely to test the application of law to fact, but also to urge that their case
is different from those that have gone before.”146 They “extend the reach
of the rule[s] to activities not quite covered by it in a formal sense,” giving
effect to “the sense that . . . it would be unfair and unjust to allow
constitutional principles to be undermined by subterfuge and artifice.”147
This is presented as a normative justification for AEDs generally; this is
unnecessary for AEDS that in fact implement constitutional operative
propositions, which are justified on whatever terms decision rules in
general are justified (the substantive fairness argument certainly cannot
justify the practice of making decision rules). If the question were,
instead, whether using AEDs to prevent circumvention of decision rules
is legitimate despite the general objections to making doctrine binding,
then this substantive fairness claim would, perhaps, be well presented.148
Regardless, these are normative questions. Metadoctrinal theory does not
provide a method for assessing them; but the distinction between
operative propositions and decision rules certainly adds important nuance
to the debate.149
The Permissible Gap—The TOT is consistent with a variety of general
theories of constitutional practice—one is Sager’s concept of
underenforcement, in which courts do not fully enforce all constitutional
norms with doctrine, but nonjudicial officials remain bound to norms’
“full conceptual limits” of obligation.150 We can usefully reformulate
this as the Permissible Gap Thesis (“PGT”), namely: “there is a
permissible disparity between ‘doctrinal rights’ and ‘background
rights.’”151 This gives us an account of a constitutional system in which
judicial enforcement does not comprise the total potential effect of
145. See id. at 1808–10. See generally Roosevelt, supra note 80 (exploring these legitimacy
problems at length); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002) (canvassing similar issues).
146. Id. at 1803 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 995–
96 (1995)).
147. Id. at 1804.
148. Interestingly, if Denning and Kent were to argue that AEDs may legitimately be used to
preclude “clever” violations of the spirit of decision rules; this might distinguish AEDS from
standard decision rules conceptually on the dimension of function. Decision rules implement
operative propositions, but AEDs, on this hypothetical account, would enforce decision rules.
149. Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 32–33 n.18.
150. See Sager, supra note 79, at 1221 (advancing thesis that underenforced constitutional
norms should be understood as “legally valid to their full conceptual limit”).
151. Berman, Rights, supra note 74 (citing and quoting Fallon, supra note 114, at 1323–31).
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constitutional norms, one in which all government institutions and
officials have constitutional obligations independent of the possibility of
their judicial enforcement. Sager builds on this insight to generate a
vision of a justice-seeking constitutionalism in which the courts act in
partnership with other branches to, over time in an iterative process,
articulate and refine a set of constitutional obligations that are designed
to maximize justice, broadly conceived, under contemporary
circumstances.152 Whether and to what extent government institutions
and actors can be expected to comply with constitutional norms without
judicial enforcement is, of course, one of the deepest and most long-lived
questions of constitutional theory.153
The claim that AEDs are ubiquitous in constitutional law makes for a
different picture of the system. Denning and Kent’s focus on
circumvention concerns suggests a lack of trust on the part of the
judiciary that other government actors will comply with all constitutional
obligations that lie within the norm-doctrine gap (“gap obligations”).
Such mistrust is not inconsistent with maintaining that such obligations
exist; as a normative matter we might even want to encourage less trust,
deference, and so forth, on certain issues. But for descriptive purposes,
abandoning PGT’s corresponding blanket presumption of gap-obligation
compliance capacity raises a question about the instrumental calculation
involved where a court decides to underenforce a norm, defer to a
coordinate branch, or otherwise leave a question of constitutional
compliance to a nonjudicial actor. Denning and Kent recognize that there
are such instances—that would be difficult to deny.154 To justify these
kinds of decision rules—some of which the authors call AAEDs in a
follow-on piece155—we need criteria for trusting or mistrusting
nonjudicial actors on norm compliance from context to context. The
authors do not provide such an account in that article; they focus instead
on identifying what seem like judicial calculations that certain avenues
of potential norm violation need to be addressed, without attending to the

152. See generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004).
153. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (1893) (engaging the question with respect to
Congress). More recent is Fallon’s magisterial treatment of the subject in the abstract. Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraint, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975 (2009). Entire symposia have been
held on the value of pre-commitment strategies, like constitutionalism, for constraining
governments. See generally John Robertson, “Paying the Alligator”: Precommitment in Law,
Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1729 (2003).
154. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1776 (noting that doctrines can “overenforce or
underenforce constitutional commands”).
155. See generally Denning & Kent, supra note 131.
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separate question of whether they should be addressed by courts or,
instead, a different institution. And it is difficult to think of generalizable
criteria that do not reproduce the problem. If, for example, we maintain
that courts are justified in deferring compliance questions to Congress
wherever the basic constitutional question is better suited for legislative
judgment, we must argue that capacity entails or is a good proxy for
fidelity, which is not obviously true.156
Denning and Kent make something like this claim in their piece on
AAEDs, arguing that courts appear to avoid adopting AEDs or reject
preexisting AEDs where one reasonably could conclude that “the
constitutional principle is adequately protected by robust political
safeguards.”157 This is an intriguing possibility, but it relies on some key
assumptions that go unexamined. First, we still need to know whether
the existence of political safeguards is a legitimate criterion for trusting
coordinate branches to tend their gap obligations—Denning and Kent
only argue that this appears to be the criterion courts have adopted, not
that it is justified. What factors are present where political safeguards
operate that suggest we can trust the political process on constitutional
compliance issues? Denning and Kent propose something like a rough
institutional competence calculation: where the constitutional
compliance issue is salient in the political process, then there may be
democratic pressure on institutions and officials to comply with
constitutional obligations.158 At least, that is the view that they attribute
to courts that reject AEDs. But this reproduces the problem—or so it
seems—because we are left to wonder why courts should trust the public
to press for constitutional compliance, even if the issues are salient in
principle. Most public choice accounts suggest that voters care far more
about substantive policy outcomes than they do constitutional
(“framework”) issues in, for example, the federalism context,159 where
156. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (positing a theory of
justified judicial intervention predicated on assessing the extent to which an action has, or has not,
passed through a sufficiently inclusive political vetting). But see sources cited infra note 159.
157. Denning & Kent, supra note 131, at 398.
158. Id. at 422–25 (emphasizing the capacity of political processes to “police” or “monitor” for
abuse and government compliance with certain constitutional norms).
159. See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131
(2004); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 103 (2004). But cf. Robert A. Mikos, The Populist
Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1673–74 (2007) (analyzing survey evidence
suggesting that some voters do care about federalism as a constitutional obligation in itself).
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the political-safeguards argument for judicial underenforcement of
constitutional norms has a sixty-year pedigree.160 Denning and Kent’s
proposed criterion, then, is a gloss on the conventional institutional
capacity calculation that we associate with the choice between deference
and judicial scrutiny of legislative purpose—and that, of course, does not
incorporate the trustworthiness evaluation that the anti-circumvention
concern seems to require.
We could explain decisions to reject AEDs in at least two other ways:
First, they could be based on assessments of the comparative expertise of
other branches on the particular constitutional compliance issue (most
plausible, perhaps, in the Commerce Clause and foreign affairs powers
contexts). Second, they could be based on assessments of the extent to
which the Constitution itself submits particular issues to administration
by non-judicial departments (most plausible in the political question and
federalism contexts). These accounts suggest a generally trusting view
of nonjudicial actors’ tendency to discharge gap obligations that is
consistent with the presumption of constitutionality courts have long
accorded government actions161 and different from Denning and Kent’s
“bad person” theory of nonjudicial action.162 In contrast, of course, we
have the public choice theory picture that portrays Congress as an
agglomeration of self-interested actors who are as concerned with
constitutional requirements as they are with other obstacles to their own
goals, but no more.163 If this is the right view, it raises prima facie
160. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954) (giving the seminal articulation of the political safeguards of federalism); Ernest A. Young,
Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001) (canvassing the treatment of
Wechsler’s theory in courts and scholarship).
161. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810). For a strong formulation
and defense of the presumption, rooted in the view that Congress, not the judiciary, is properly the
primary interpreter of the Constitution, see generally Thayer, supra note 153, at 136. But see
Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 553–76 (2010) (critiquing
various extreme departmentalist views, including Thayer’s).
162. This is a reference to Justice Holmes’ famous theory of law that centered on the “bad
man”—for a bad person only interested in avoiding legal sanction, the law is no more than how a
court is likely to behave. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897). Holmes’s “prediction theory” of law was, famously, refuted by Hart as ignoring a
phenomenon with which we are all familiar, the internal point of view in which one views laws to
be obligation-imposing independent of the possibility of sanction. HART, supra note 28, at 100–
03.
163. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress,
50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1287 (2001) (reciting “realist” accounts of congressional behavior) (citing Ian
Shapiro, Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is About Interests and Power, in DELIBERATIVE
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 28 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999)); Edward
L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of
Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991).
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circumvention concerns in every context. Some preexisting decision
rules may be more insensitive to manipulation than others, and that might
explain why we do not need AEDs in some contexts; but that explanation
is quite different form the one Denning and Kent offer.
Once again we are left with competing hypotheses about judicial
behavior that need to be tested but, as yet, have not been. Metadoctrinal
theory certainly does not provide an answer, or the path to an answer.
And as for the justifiability of any of these views of non-judicial actors’
tendency to comply with their constitutional obligations; this sort of
compliance, much of which will be in the form of refraining from acting,
will be very challenging to quantify.
CONCLUSION
Legal theory needs a metatheory. We cannot continue to debate the
merits of positive and normative claims—such as claims about whether
this or that theory of constitutional interpretation discloses the “truth”
about what the constitutional law is—without a framework for evaluating
which claim is more correct when they compete with one another.
Drawing from the philosophy of science to create such a framework is
capacious: it gives us analytical tools with which to assess competing
claims; it may serve to legitimate legal theory against the common
criticism represented by Judge Posner’s and Judge Wilkinson’s
challenges to add rigor or close up shop. Such a framework for
comparative claim assessment may also be adapted to operate at several
levels of generality; we could judge everything from claims about
whether constitutional law is determined by consensus or moral merits
on the one hand to claims about whether this or that doctrine of
constitutional law should be characterized as a decision rule or an antievasion doctrine on the other. I have made preliminary efforts here; a
practicable framework will take both more work from those involved in
constitutional theory and the acceptance of the research program’s
participants more broadly to gain traction. I hope this will be the first
step.

